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The strategic economic governance of Greater Manchester¶VORFDOODERXU 
market by the local state: Implications for young workers 
 
 
Abstract: 
This paper explores how work and employment conditions for young workers are affected by 
the actions of the state at the spatial scale of the locality. The paper argues that young 
workers have experienced deteriorating labour market conditions following shifts in the form 
which capitalist accumulation takes in the UK. This shift has altered the composition of the 
British state which has in turn led to changes in both how the national state regulates local 
labour markets and the economic strategies of the local state.  One result of these changes is 
the diffusion of neoliberal labour market reforms which have led to negative material 
consequences for young workers; this is manifest in the expansion of low-waged work 
concentrated in a small number of sectors, and characterised by an intensified labour 
process. 
  
 
Key Words: Economic Change, Employment, Local Labour Market, Local State, 
Young Workers 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper connects work and shifts in the political economy of the British state by exploring 
how work and employment conditions for young workers ± those aged 16-241 - are affected 
by the actions of the state at the µspatial scale¶ of µthe locality¶.  Spatial scale in this sense 
refers to the geographic spaces within which capitalist processes occur, as well as referring to 
where labour concretely experiences the outcomes of capitalist processes  (Harvey, 1989a; 
2006).   The spatial scale of the locality is important because it is at this scale that key social 
                                                 
1
 This definition of young workers is in line with Office for National Statistics (ONS) and International Labour 
Organization (ILO) definitions.  (ILO, 2016; ONS, 2016) 
 2 
 
processes occur, most notably: the reproduction of household economies; provision of state 
welfare services, and; paid labour, which is characterised by a varied labour process.  A focus 
on the state is insightful because it is the local state which is immediately responsible for 
confronting the contradictory outcomes of capitalist production and the labour process within 
a locality. 
 
This paper argues that since the early 1980s young workers have experienced worsening 
labour market conditions due to shifts in processes of capitalist accumulation - from what this 
SDSHU FDOOV ³Iull-HPSOR\PHQW´ FDSLWDOLVP WR ³finance-OHG´ FDSLWDOLVP. This shift is 
characterised by the tendency of capital to accumulate surplus value through the 
appropriation of value, rather than through the productive accumulation of value (Fine, 
2013).  Full-employment capitalism saw a contested diffusion of mass production and mass 
consumption integrated within a broadly defined but equally contested political compromise 
between state planners, capital and labour. Accumulated capital in the form of profit was then 
appropriated from existing value produced by labour; this circulation in the circuit of 
productive capital redistributed surplus-value to labour via productivity gains and capital via 
investment in capital stock.  The circuit of finance-led capitalism is in contrast to this 
strategy, and is premised on a falling labour share of income and a re-commodification of 
labour (Thompson, 2013; Stockhammer et al. 2016). The re-composition of the state and 
associated processes that result from these shifts in accumulation impact on the form of 
labour market intervention, associated regulations, and on the very capacity of the state to 
intervene, particularly at the level of the local state which has undergone substantial 
transformation  (Brenner, 2004; Greer, 2016; Hastings & Heyes, 2016). 
 
Why Greater Manchester? Why Young Workers? 
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The metropolitan county of Greater Manchester2 was selected as a focus of study due to the 
character of its political economy; the county experienced a period a marked decline 
throughout the post-war period, reaching a nadir in the 1980s, as deindustrialisation led in 
1983 to long-term unemployment rates of 47.6% for men and 29.8% for women (Peck & 
Emmerich, 1992: 29).  Since the 1980s local state managers have presented an image of the 
county which highlights its renaissance from de-industrialisation to that of a successful, 
µSRVW-LQGXVWULDO¶county characterised by a diverse local economy (McDermot, 2015).  Local 
elites - in particular local state executives and members of prominent local business fora - 
point to the Greater Manchester Devolution Agreement, in which the county gains greater 
oversight of £7 billion of central government funding and increased retention of business 
rates revenue, as the culmination of the success of their local economic strategy (HM 
Treasury, 2014). However, Greater Manchester is affected by high and increasing levels of 
low-paid employment3 (New Economy, 2015), rising inequality (Centre for Cities, 2014), and 
an absence of affordable housing (GMCA, 2015).  All three of these social outcomes are felt 
most keenly by young people (Clark & Heath, 2014). By focusing on the role of the local 
state in shaping labour market outcomes this paper reveals how the imperatives of capitalist 
accumulation cajole the state to pursue economic strategies which affect different types of 
labour differentially, leading to differentiated labour processes.   
 
The established literature suggests a worsening of labour market conditions for young people 
± the UK youth unemployment rate is currently 13.7%, which is 2.7 times higher than all-age 
                                                 
2
 Greater Manchester is a metropolitan county made up of ten metropolitan boroughs: Bolton, Bury, Manchester, 
Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford, and Wigan.  As of 2016, total employment is over 
1.3 million, of which approximately 187, 000 are aged 16-24.    
3
 Low paid employment is defined by the Low Pay Commission as employment in which pay is below two-
thirds of the median income. 
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unemployment4 (ONS, 2016) and the youth unemployment ratio is 20.2%; an historical high 
LQWKH8.2¶5HLOO\HWDO.  Similarly, whilst 21% of all-age workers in the UK are in 
low-paid employment the number is 40% for workers aged 21-25 and 77% for workers aged 
16-20 (&ODUNH	'¶$rcy, 2016: 20).  
 
This paper addresses two research questions.  Firstly,  in what ways do changes in local 
governance and associated changes in the political economy of work  ground and re-focus 
capitalist accumulation away from the nation state towards capital,  shift from ³IXOO
HPSOR\PHQWFDSLWDOLVP´ WRZDUGV³ILQDQFH-OHGFDSLWDOLVP´? Secondly, what is the impact of 
these changes on young workers in Greater Manchester?  To explore the research questions, 
the paper divides into four parts; part one provides an overview of shifts in the British state 
and defines the WHUP WKH µORFDO VWDWH¶ 3DUW WZR FRQWDLQV DQ HPSLULFDO RYHUview of Greater 
0DQFKHVWHU¶V JRYHUQDQFH DUUDQJHPHQWV SDUWLFXODUO\ WKRVH ZKLFK UHODWH WR ORFDO HFRQRPLF
governance.  Part three provides empirical evidence to demonstrate how local economic 
strategies affect labour market outcomes for young workers.  Part four contains a discussion 
which examines the limits of these strategies, and is followed by a conclusion.   
 
Research Methods  
This research is based on findings from a local labour market study of the metropolitan 
county of Greater Manchester undertaken in 2015-16 which draws on 32 semi-structured 
interviews with local state officials and politicians, local entrepreneurs and CEOs, and other 
labour market actors such as trade unionists and local charities. The interviews were 
transcribed and coded in order to carry out systematic thematic analysis.  In addition to this 
                                                 
4
 All-age unemployment is 5.1%, as of 2016.   
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primary research extensive desk research was undertaken to examine existing local policy 
documents, economic reports, and data-sets.  
  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
1. A neoliberal state and finance-led capitalism 
 
The two research questions connect work and the shift in the political economy of the British 
state by outlining how the move from full-employment capitalism to finance-led capitalism 
supported by a neoliberal state is grounded in the work and employment experiences of 
young workers in Greater Manchester. The paper outlines the motives and instruments of the 
shift in the class character of the state and specifies how some of these macro-level changes 
are grounded in deteriorating employment opportunities and by association worsening labour 
process experiences at work. 
 
The contemporary British state promotes austerity and welfare retrenchment policies which 
create significant labour market inequalities, such as low-paid, precarious work which 
particularly affects young workers (Papadopoulos, 2014; Selenko & Pils, 2016).   These 
labour market conditions are enabled and facilitated in part by the decline of embedded 
liberal policies which existed under full employment capitalism (Harvey, 2007; Crouch, 
2011; Standing, 2014).  TKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHRI%ULWDLQ¶VSROLWLFDOHFRQRP\in the post-
war period meant that µembedded liberalism¶ %UHQQHUHWDO010) positively restrained the 
entrepreneurial zeal of capital by the application of active economic and industrial strategies, 
such as; capital controls, wage councils, and sectoral level collective bargaining. (Brown et 
al., 2009)  These features were complemented by the institutional power of trade unions, 
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which afforded workers the structural capacity to resist degradation of work and employment 
imposed on labour by capital.  
 
Young workers benefitted in this period from the presence of well-developed internal labour 
markets within large firms, characterised by established training schemes and well-defined 
entry points for young workers.  (MacDonald, 1998)  These conditions were particularly 
evident in the public sector, and in engineering firms.  Job opportunities in these sectors for 
\RXQJ SHRSOH ZHUH RIWHQ µVKHOWHUHG¶ PHDQLQJ WKDW FRPSHWLWLRQ ZDV UHVWULFWHG WR \RXQJ
people, rather than all-age workers. (Ashton et al., 1990)  However, whilst embedded 
liberalism delivered good economic performance up until the 1960s it began to breakdown in 
the early 1970s, when supporters of what is now termed neoliberalism were poised to free 
capital from broader socio-economic commitments HVWDEOLVKHG LQ %ULWDLQ¶V SRVW-war full-
employment state.   
 
 Neoliberalism, which underpins finance-led capitalism, is built on ideas which circulated in 
think tanks, learned societies and alternative economic associations during the period of 
embedded liberalism. (Desai, 1994) Free market ideas were present in Westminster political 
circles long before they were crystalized into a coherent outlook for modern society as part of 
µThatcherism¶ $ broad-ranging political project, Thatcherism FHQWUHG RQ µGLVHPEHGGLQJ¶
markets from political constraints associated with embedded liberalism to focus on de-
regulation, privatization and the creation of new markets through sustained financial de-
regulation and liberalization. (Harvey, 2007:19-30; Crouch, 2011)  Economic re-structuring, 
informed by neoliberalism and by finance-led capitalism represents a social revolution from 
above designed to restore the power of elite interests in the UK; both neoliberalism and 
finance-led capitalism are not necessary outcomes of crisis and economic re-structuring but 
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alternatively a class based political construction for the state on behalf of capital (Clarke, 
2005; Cox & Nilsen, 2014:136). 
 
Elites in financial capitalism have unwound the UK¶s post-war economic settlement which 
informed the embedded liberalism of full-employment capitalism. A consequence of this shift 
is that managers of capital and state managers are more likely to respond to the demands of 
financial markets over those of labour markets.  Financial markets are favoured because the 
erosion of embedded liberalism has undermined alliances between state managers, 
managerial elites, trade unions and workers which prevailed intermittently in the post-war 
period.  The breakdown of embedded liberalism has consequences for labour, and young 
workers in particular, which are still unravelling today. A first grounded consequence for 
labour which follows the erosion of embedded liberalism in the British state is its one-
directional nature. Since the City of London µ%LJ %DQJ¶ LQ  SULYDWL]DWLRQ
financialization and the associated shift of power to the broadly defined financial sector and  
away from the public sector and the manufacturing sector cannot be undone other than on the 
margins (Seifert, 2016:751). These shifts encountered no significant bloc of business 
opposition lobbying for an alternative corporatist or co-ordinated policy (van der Pijl, 2006). 
The transition to finance-led capitalism was achieved by financial de-regulation and 
integration internationally where financial capital and capital markets are now centrally 
concerned with the market for corporate control and investor value. %ULWDLQ¶V JOREDOO\
focussed neoliberalism supersedes the embedded liberalism of full-employment capitalism to 
ground a second consequence for workers which follows the dismantling of  collective 
structures for labour, the local state and associated communities.   
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For labour a particular effect of these shifts and transitions is the role of the British economy 
in a new international division of labour (Charnock & Starosta, 2016). Over the past thirty 
years the British economy has found a sustained competitive advantage in financial services 
provided by indigenous and internationalized capital, both of which operate on a global basis. 
Whilst the financial sector can provide opportunities for high wage, higher productivity 
employment the overall numbers of jobs are small.  In 2010-16, only 600 jobs were created in 
the financial sector in Greater Manchester, this figure is set against overall labour market 
growth in Greater Manchester of 96, 000 over the same period, meaning that the financial 
sector accounted for only 0.6% of job growth  (New Economy, 2015).   
A second form of sustained competitive advantage centres on the attractiveness of Britain for 
inward foreign direct investment (FDI).  Multinational firms are encouraged to set-up branch 
plants which are subject to intra-firm internationally focused competition for work within 
dispersed global value chains (Hammer and Rissgaard, 2015:84-5).  Between 2010 and 2016 
approximately 17, 994 jobs were created as a result of inward FDI investment in Greater 
Manchester, meaning that inward FDI was responsible for approximately 19% of new jobs 
created in the period (MIDAS, 2016).  There are opportunities for young workers to find 
employment resulting from inward investment, although the benefits of such work are 
skewed heavily in favour of capital.  As our empirical research demonstrates, many young 
SHRSOH LQ 0DQFKHVWHU DUH HPSOR\HG QRW LQ ³KHDGOLQH´ VHFWRUV RI ILQDQFH RU DGYDnced 
manufacturing, but in more elementary sectors including business services, care, and retail 
and hospitality.  Within these sectors, young people tend to find themselves employed in low-
paid, lower occupational roles; a trend which is increasing. 40.6% of young people in Greater 
Manchester work in the retail and hospitality sectors, and 55% of young people work in sales, 
customer service, and elementary occupations (See tables 1 and 2).   
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The capacities of the local state  
Shifts in British political economy directly affect the composition of local state. In the 1960s 
the British state diffused µVSDWLDO .H\QHVLDQ¶ redistributive policies designed to aid 
underperforming economic regions. (Martin & Sunley, 1997; Brenner, 2004)  The movement 
towards financialised capitalism under a neoliberal state saw these policies wound-up.  
Instead localities began to HQJDJH LQ µentrepreneurial urbanisW¶ VWUDWHJLHV which rely on 
securing private capital to fund local economic development as public funding from central 
government diminished. (Harvey, 1989b)  This reliance causes local economic strategies to 
become competitive in the pursuit of capital investment and in order to secure funding bids. 
(Cochrane et al., 1996; 2002)    Local councils can experience sudden and unexpected cuts to 
their budgets as a result of central government executive control over local government 
spending levels (Lowdnes & Gardner, 2016).  This fiscal and monetary insecurity means that 
local councils have to actively pursue growth orientated strategies which rely on the private 
sector.  These circumstances have worsened since 2010 due to the increased ferocity with 
which local government cuts have been implemented stimulating the argument that central 
government has µORFNHG-LQ¶QHROLEHUDOPHDVXUHVDWWKHORFDOOHYHO (Peck, 2014).  
 
In spite of these structural limitations on its actions it is the local state which confronts the 
immediate consequences of capitalist accumulation. The local state is charged with enabling, 
managing and maintaining the µSURGXFWLRQ-UHSURGXFWLRQQH[XV¶ (PRN) within a locality.  The 
PRN is defined as WKHµLQWHUUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQSURGXFWLRQDQGUHSURGXFWLRQYLDWKHODERXU
IRUFHLQDJLYHQJHRJUDSKLFWHUULWRU\¶ (Gough, 2014: 28).   The strategies pursued by the local 
state to achieve this can be characterised in two broad categories; neoliberal, and social 
democratic.  Neoliberal strategies promote the flow of all capitals and emphasise discipline 
over labour via enhanced mobility, spatial fragmentation and increased competition. In turn 
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these strategies focus on the reduction and equalisation of factor costs and final prices and 
effectively use the national state to minimise regulation by the local state (Gough, 2004: 203).  
This approach subordinates the local state to individual capitals and capital in general by 
expanding the influence of value relations at the local level; the local state must engage with 
capital and this has to the potential to lead to the increased commodification and 
marketization of society.  In contrast to neoliberal strategies, social democratic strategies are 
characterised by the creation of socio-economic organisations designed to increase 
productivity and foster cooperation between labour and capital. The aim of this approach is to 
promote a qualitative differentiation between local economies and the autonomy of the local 
state from capital to secure accumulation on a more independent political footing (Gough, 
2004: 205). The local state can attempt to achieve this aim by promoting the growth of 
specific sectors of the local economy, or by encouraging the incorporation of other 
stakeholders ± such as community groups and trade unions ± in the governance of the local 
economy. 
 
Capitalist accumulation by its very nature is contradictory so accordingly both neoliberal and 
social democratic strategies have limitations, as each favour one set of contradictory 
outcomes over the other. Neoliberal strategies can be characterized as instrumental and can  
lead to increased inequality and a worsening of employment relations across labour markets 
as capital develops more control over the state, for example as a local state comes to rely on 
inward investment to create employment.  Social democratic strategies, by contrast, may 
espouse relative autonomy and lead to increased productivity and infrastructure development 
by greater spending on economic development, as the local state is able to act in the interest 
of all capital rather than individual capitals. However, neoliberal critics are likely to 
characterise this as expenditure which diverts from job creation, in spite of the possibility that 
 11 
 
social democratic strategies can nevertheless precursor and inform neoliberal outcomes 
because they promote and sustain capitalist value relations, albeit in a wider stakeholder 
form. This shift can occur as any socially beneficial gains from social democratic strategies 
are contingent on capital cooperating with labour via the state, a relationship that can 
degenerate if individual capitals retreat into instrumentalism to focus on individual, short-
term profit.   
 
The outcomes of local economic strategies are heavily contingent on a number of factors.  
For example, the local state may attempt WR FUHDWH ³decent MREV´ in the private sector by 
promoting the growth of particular high value-added sectors by re-orientating its local 
economic structures so that they assist the accumulation of private capital.  Local state 
managers seek to achieve this is by the creating a subsidized investment climate. Measures 
associated with this include subsidized business rates and associated financial incentives, a 
well-developed transport infrastructure, and a suitably skilled labour supply (MIDAS, 2016).  
However, these local conditions are to the advantage of firms which operate a business model 
which is characterised by low-wage, low-value added growth. Evidence from existing 
research shows that there is a tendency for this to occur, as firms which are attracted by 
financial incentives are often those with low levels of productivity, and have a proclivity to 
engage in rent-seeking behaviour (Sonn & Lee, 2012).  This means that the firm will take 
financial incentives that are offered without generating correspondingly high levels of 
employment for the local economy.   
 
2. The governance of Greater Manchester¶VORFDOODERXUPDUNHW 
The contemporary governance of Greater Manchester is the result of historical processes of 
transformation which began with the 1985 abolitLRQ RI WKH µPXQLFLSDO VRFLDOLVW¶ Greater 
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Manchester County Council which was hostile to working with either central government or 
private capital (Quilley, 2000).  Abolition led to the creation of the Association of Greater 
Manchester Authorities (AGMA), comprised of ten metropolitan borough councils.  The 
formation of AGMA fostered more cooperation between local and national government 
where local officials sought to work with private sector capital  (Peck & Ward, 2002).  The 
strategy of co-operation with private capital intensified during the 1990s as local business 
elites became directly involved in the governance of the county through the control of 
Training and Enterprise Councils (Peck, 1998).  This period was characterised as both µORFDO
HOLWLVP¶and µHOLWHORFDOLVP¶ (Cochrane et al., 1996).  However, limitations to this approach to 
local governance soon became apparent; local business leaders chose not to cooperate in a 
long-term strategy for the county.  Instead, local business leaders focused on ensuring the 
profitability of their own businesses and the actions of some business leaders actively 
undermined attempts by local government to engage in long-term strategic economic 
planning in the county by preventing the local state from being able to act for capital in a 
collective sense (Peck & Tickell, 1995).  Nonetheless the development of Greater Manchester 
in recent decades is viewed as a success by local state managers who point to its economic 
growth in comparison to neighbouring cities-regions, such as Liverpool or Leeds-Bradford 
(McDermot, 2015).  In successfully overcoming the high unemployment of the 1980s 
0DQFKHVWHU¶V state managers argue that a post-manufacturing local economy has developed 
where a majority of employment is in the service sector.  One local economic manager 
suggested that this was partially due to: 
 
µ«DVHQVHRI>YROXQWDU\@FROODERUDWLYHZRUNLQJLQ*UHDWHU0DQFKHVWHU¶V>ORFDOJRYernment] 
that far exceeded that of Liverpool and Leeds-Bradford, [which along with]  Sheffield have 
not taken off in same way as Manchester¶ ,QWHUYLHZ ZLWK Director of Economic Strategy, 
local university, 11th January, 2016) 
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The manner in which capital informs and shapes the strategic direction of governance in the 
county is evidenced in the central role of the Greater Manchester Local Enterprise 
Partnership, (GMLEP).  According to its own official statement of intent, the GMLEP sits µat 
the KHDUWRI*UHDWHU0DQFKHVWHU¶VJRYHUQDQFHDUUDQJHPHQWVHQVXULQJWKDWEXVLQHVVOHDGHUV
are empowered to set the strategic course, determine local priorities and drive growth and 
job creation within the city-UHJLRQ¶5 (GMLEP, 2015).  The partnership is made up of two 
local councillors, the interim mayor of Greater Manchester, and nine representatives from the 
private sector.  The GMLEP has no representatives from voluntary organisations or trade 
unions, despite a White Paper recommending the inclusion of these groups (Ward, 2014).  
Along with AGMA, the GMLEP is responsible for overseeing the Manchester Growth 
Company (MGC). The MGC is made up of a number of companies which promote economic 
development across the county in six priority functions: strategy and research; marketing; 
business support and finance; organisation development services; skills, and employment 
(See figure 1 for a visualisation of this).   
 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
This network of governance actors aims to ensure continued economic growth through the 
promotion of the county as a site of investment with favourable conditions for private capital.  
This approach can be understood as an attempt to overcome the limits of economic 
governance in Greater Manchester in the 1990s, which shifted too much power directly to the 
                                                 
5
 Greater Manchester is part of the Greater Manchester Statutory City Region, which comprises the 10 
metropolitan boroughs of Greater Manchester, alongside five neighbouring boroughs, to create geographical 
area with a population of 3. 36 million, as of 2015.  (ONS, 2015) 
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private sector.  Instead, the MGC seeks to govern the local economy for and on behalf of 
private capital.   Rather than allowing private capital to directly govern the county the local 
state has established a series of quasi-autonomous bodies which are shielded from popular 
pressures and which have the broad aim of advancing the rate of capital accumulation within 
the locality.  This was acknowledged by one planner, who stated that: 
 
µ«\RX FDQ QHYHU UHDOO\ H[SHFW EXVLQHVV OHDGHUV WR UXQ WKH VWDWH WKDW¶V QRW ZKDW WKH\ do, 
alright?  They run businesses and OHW¶V hope they keep doing it.  So how [do] you co-opt, in a 
non-executive fashion, functioning of business leaders? Call it what you want ± LW¶V called the 
[GM@/(3¶ (Interview, senior strategic planner, AGMA, 4th February 2016) 
 
Both the MGC and the GMLEP are unaccountable to the electorate and sustain self-
determining, self-elected governance structures which are a form of neoliberal, de-politicised 
local governance in which power is transferred from elected officials to unaccountable 
institutions (Burnham, 2001).  One local councillor voiced concerns on the diminished role 
that local councillors have as a result of shifts in local governance, in which decision-making 
power has been transferred away from elected representatives and to the executive and 
unaccountable business leaders:  
 
µ«ZH
UHFDUGERDUGFXW-outs ± [the executive]  wheel us out when there's a meeting, we stick 
RXUKDQGVXSDQGVD\\HDKDQGJRKRPH«,¶YH MXVW IHOW WRWDOO\ VXUSOXV WR UHTXLUHPHQW IRU
DJHVQRZDQG,JHWWKHLPSUHVVLRQWKDWPDQ\FRXQFLOORUVGREXWZRQ¶WDGPLWLW¶(Interview, 
local Councillor, 8th February, 2016) 
 
The limited capacity of the local state to progressively intervene in any meaningful sense to 
generate progressive local labour market outcomes was described succinctly by the current 
head of research at a local economic development agency, who stated that: 
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µ RI ZKDW KDSSHQV LQ *UHDWHU 0DQFKHVWHU >ORFDO JRYHUQPHQW@ KDV QR FRQWURO RYHU¶
(Head of research, local economic development agency.  Interview, 9th March 2016) 
 
 3. Strategies of economic growth  
All cities seek to develop economically; indeed, due to the pressures of entrepreneurial 
urbanism cities must engage in competitive growth policies in order to prevent urban decline.  
In Greater Manchester key strategies for economic growth centre on the extension of labour 
market reforms, in particular those focusing on moving the economically inactive into work, 
and on up-skilling the labour force. The result of these strategies is mixed and leaves some 
young workers languishing in low-quality employment.   For example, Greater Manchester¶V, 
eye-catching aggregate growth figures6 mask the qualitative form which employment growth 
has taken in the county.  The strategy of economic growth that is pursued in Greater 
Manchester is based on efforts to develop its internal capacities, most notably through 
infrastructure development and promotion of ³KHDGOLQH´ sectors in which the county has a 
competitive advantage.  These sectors include advanced manufacturing, finance and 
professional services, health sciences, and the digital sector (New Economy, 2016a).  The 
growth of these sectors is supported by MGC by its local boosterism, and through the support 
the MGC offers to businesses already established in the county, such as through its µ*URZWK
+XE¶EXVLQHVV LQQRYDWRU which helps firms to access expertise and funding, as well as and 
assisting with provision of flexible workspace at competitive rates (AGMA, 2009: 28). 
 
Efforts by state managers to promote headline sectors aim to coordinate and regulate 
economic growth, directing resource into prescribed sites and sectors.  These strategies are 
                                                 
6
 Greater 0DQFKHVWHU¶VJURZWKUDWHH[FHHGHGWKDWRIWKH6RXWK-East (excluding London) for the first time in 
2013. 
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limited, in part because they downplay the significance of the relationship between cities and 
wider socio-economic processes at other spatial scales, in particular between Greater 
Manchester and speculative financial flows, as well as the skewed relationship between the 
local and national state which favours the latter.  Therein local policy development is limited 
as local state managers are unable to respond to external shocks or abrupt national policy 
shifts, or to challenge deep-rooted problems which are the result of historical political 
economy. Therein changes in industrial composition in Manchester have embedded 
concentrated areas of enduring unemployment.  
 
Extending existing labour market reforms  
British labour markets have experienced waves of reform in recent decades as part of ongoing 
processes to stimulate labour productivity in order to enhance the competitiveness of UK-
based capital.  Labour market reforms are FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ WKH SURPRWLRQ RI µVNLOOV DV
ZHOIDUH¶LQZKLFKVNLOOVGHYHORSPHQWEHFRPHVWKHURXWHWRHPSOR\PHQWDQGFRPHVWRUHSODFH
unemployment benefit as the preferred form of welfare intervention for the unemployed or 
economically inactive. (Nunn, 2008)  This agenda is evident in Greater Manchester; across 
the county 22% of the labour force is educated to national vocational qualification (NVQ) 
level two and 32% are educated to NVQ level 4+, whilst 11.6% have no qualifications at all.  
This compares unfavourably to the national picture (20%, 36%, and 9% (ONS, 2014a)).  Low 
levels of skills amongst the labour force are seen as a problem by local elites.  According to 
official documentation:   
µ«a quarter of the productivity gap between Greater Manchester and the UK as a whole [is] 
caused by higher than average levels of worklessness and low levels of economic activity. 
The other three quarters [are]  caused by lower levels of economic output, with people in 
work not as productive as elsewhere in the country. Low skill levels are a key contributing 
factor to this¶ ($XWKRUV¶ emphasis) (AGMA, 2013).  
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Moreover, labour market weaknesses are identified by local state managers as a key factor 
which prevents the county from achieving high growth rates.  The strategy to overcome these 
weaknesses centres on DFWLYHODERXUPDUNHWSROLFLHVWRWDFNOHSHUFHLYHGµZRUNOHVVQHVV¶ and a 
focus on improving the skills base of Greater Manchester.  This approach targets workless 
labour and is generalized from contemporary national policy which focuses on austerity, 
retrenchment and the re-commodification of labour. These aims witness the introduction of 
policies which have the effect of coercing individuals back into labour markets, often through 
disciplinary measures such as removal of welfare benefits. These measures exemplify 
neoliberal approaches to labour which eschew any attempt to understand or resolve the 
complex and multi-faceted reasons why individuals might become workless and instead 
individualise the negative consequences of unemployment onto the unemployed (Nunn, 
2012). 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
Local economic outcomes 
A key question is whether the application of neoliberal strategies by local state managers has 
been successful in increasing productivity, as productivity increases are both a key driver of 
growth, and a prerequisite for more equitable labour market outcomes, if mechanisms exist 
for increases to be distributed amongst workers.  Although gross valued added (GVA) has 
increased across the county, it does not follow that there are equal rises in productivity across 
all sectors.  Rather than this the PDMRULW\RIVHFWRUVLQ*UHDWHU0DQFKHVWHU¶V ORFDOHFRQRP\
are characterised by lower than average GVA per job.  The sectors of the local economy 
which have facilitated economic growth are a mixture of aforementioned headline sectors, 
but are also sectors which are characterised by low-wage, low-productivity employment.  The 
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five sectors with levels of productivity lower than £30,000 per job in Greater Manchester 
µcorrespond ZLWKWKHORZHVWSD\LQJVHFWRUV«[and these] low productivity sectors account for 
a growing share of jobs.  In 2000 they represented 35% of employment. By 2014 the 
proportion was 40%¶(New Economy, 2016a).  The five elementary sectors are; hospitality, 
retail, accommodation, cleaning, and residential care.  Low productivity sectors such as these 
are characterised by accumulation strategies with limited potential for productivity growth as 
surplus is generated through the intensification of the labour process and squeezing returns to 
labour  (PSOR\HUV LQ WKHVH VHFWRUV SXUVXH µORZ YDOXH SURGXFW PDUNHW VWUDWHJLHV¶ where 
FRPSHWLWLRQ LV EDVHG RQ µRQ ORZ FRVW ORZ VNLOO ORZ VSHFLILFDWLRQ SURGXFWV DQG VHUYLFHV¶ 
(UKCES, 2013; New Economy, 2016a).   
 
Evidently an accumulation strategy based on low productivity, labour intensive work with 
low levels of technological investment leads to a local occupational distribution which is 
skewed towards de-skilled, low-waged, low discretion jobs for many young people.   This is 
demonstrated by the data in tables 1 and 2, which highlight the sectoral and occupational 
distribution of young workers in Greater Manchester.     Young workers are nearly twice as 
likely to be employed in elementary occupations as all-age workers, and young workers make 
up 22% of the workforce in elementary occupations.  Additionally, young workers are nearly 
2.5 times as likely to be employed in sales and customer service occupations as all-age 
workers, and make up 33% of this occupational workforce.  In the period 2001-11 there was a 
1% reduction in the numbers of young workers employed in the top three occupational 
categories, alongside a 2% rise in numbers of young workers employed in the lowest 
occupational category.  (See table 2)  Sales and customer services occupations are 
predominantly found in the retail sector, which has an average weekly wage of £344.  This 
weekly average is significantly lower than for the public sector (£504), finance and business 
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services (£635), or for the service sector in general (£488) (ONS, 2017).  Additionally, young 
workers in all sectors are affected negatively by the national minimum wage, which 
institutionalizes lawful discrimination based on age.   
 
The labour process in elementary occupations restricts productivity increases due to de-
skilled labour use strategies for youth workers.  In the business service companies which 
were studied young workers engaged in a labour process characterised by one or two tasks ± 
such as answering calls, processing customer service requests, or inputting data - which were 
repeated throughout the day.  Worker discretion was low and attempts to raise productivity 
took the form of intrusive workplace monitoring which ranged from; listening in on phone-
calls, random sampling of workplace documents for quality checks, and unannounced 
observations of work throughout the day.  These interventions, coupled with the use of open-
plan office space and target-based performance management, created a generalised 
atmosphere of µSUHVVXUH¶ and µXQHDVH¶ for young workers (Interview notes, office manager, 
Business Services company, April 15th 2016).   
 
Greater Manchester reflects the national picture where the absence of sustained re-investment 
in the capital stock has successfully squeezed labour costs directly in the labour process 
because many jobs in manufacturing and services are highly de-skilled and subject to 
significant work intensification, fragmentation, DQG µIOH[LELOLVDWLRQ¶ (Rubery, 2015).  UK 
national accounts demonstrate that since 1982 the wages share of national income has been 
less than 56% whereas in the 1970s it rose as high as 61% of national income (OECD, 2015).  
The wage share is defined to include wages and non-wage benefits such as pensions and 
national insurance contributions. These inclusions are important because pensions and 
national insurance payments represent reproduction costs for labour. For capital the motive to 
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devalue labour is ultimately to boost short-term profits, whereas the motive for austerity and 
welfare retrenchment is to reduce the cost of re-producing labour power for capital and the 
state via the re-commodification of labour.  1RW RQO\ LV WKH 8.¶V ILQDQFH-led capitalism 
directly connected to a fall in the labour share and a decline in the agency of collective 
bargaining and trade unions but a greater debt burden too as labour seeks to sustain 
consumption levels.   These trends are evident in Greater Manchester, which is ranked third 
nationwide for levels of individual indebtedness; 41.1% of Manchester residents are classed 
as over-indebted and 21% of these are aged 18-25 (MAS, 2013). 
 
Growth in service sector employment is influenced by the availability of labour rather than by 
capital stock; accordingly there is an abundance of cheap, available labour in Greater 
Manchester in the form of young workers.  However, the elementary sectors act like a 
sponge, soaking up workers into low-productivity jobs, rather than acting as a sector which 
supports the development of more productive employment (Erdem & Glyn, 2001: 53-60).  In 
Greater Manchester the supply of young workers has been indirectly increased by the local 
state due to freedom it has afforded to property developers to construct numerous private 
rental apartments in Greater Manchester¶V city-centre which are occupied almost exclusively 
by young workers (Folkman et al., 2016). 
 
Notwithstanding the growth strategy for Manchester resting on lower productivity jobs the 
skills shortage is seen by local state managers as a significant labour market problem limiting 
productivity increases across the county.  This tension is illustrated by documents which 
DGYRFDWHWKHQHHGWRµEULGJHWKHVNLOOVJDS¶DQGµRYHUFRPHVNLOOVPLVPDWFKHV¶$*0$
2013). Specifically, skills policy takes the form of attempting to increase the numbers of 
workers with NVQ2+ qualifications as Greater Manchester has above national-average levels 
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of workers with no formal qualifications.  In part, this focus on skills comes from surveys of 
local businesses across the county, which found that local employers viewed skills shortages 
as the biggest barrier to growth (New Economy, 2016b).  As a result skills policies are 
distinctly employer-led, and have at the core, the aim of improving business growth.  As the 
2013 Stronger Together strategy document states µ[AGMA] will bring employers together 
with providers and government agencies to narrow the gap between what employers want 
and what the skills system is able to deliver¶(AGMA, 2013).   The aim of this skills strategy 
is to respond narrowly to pre-existing employer needs, thereby re-enforcing the influence of 
private employers and re-enforcing the current form which capital accumulation takes in 
Greater Manchester.  As one strategic planner remarked:  
 
µLI \RXULEPRVWSROLWLFLDQVQRWWRRKDUG>DQG@\RXVD\µ¶ZRXOG\RXUDWKHUKDYHORWVRIMREV
or less jobs buWEHWWHUMREV"¶¶WKH\¶OODOOVD\ORWVRIMREVDOZD\V«,WKLQNWKDWHYHU\ZKHUH\RX
do see the hourglass economy, you do see the high competition for high quality jobs, which 
KRRYHU XS PRUH DQG PRUH RI WKH ZHDOWK HVVHQWLDOO\ RI WKH FDSLWDO VSHQG«DQG you do see 
higher volumes of lower [quality] jobs.¶ (Former head of strategy, local Economic 
Development Agency, Interview 6th January 2016). 
 
Labour market outcomes for young workers  
 
Young workers in Greater Manchester are affected both indirectly and directly by the actions 
of the state. Indirect effects are outcomes of the economic strategy pursued by the local state, 
such as its neoliberal approach to sectoral development which has resulted in high levels of 
lower quality jobs.   Direct effects are the result of labour market reforms and interventions, 
such as active labour market policies.  Labour market reforms are problematic as they 
characterise youth unemployment and under-employment primarily as a productivity 
problem, rather than flowing from shifts in how capitalist accumulation occurs in Greater 
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Manchester.  This approach to labour market reform consolidates neoliberal accumulation 
strategies in Greater Manchester rather than seeking to develop the autonomous productive 
capacity of young workers.  As a result, interventions on youth employment are framed in a 
context of increased competitiveness, as official documentation implies:    
 
µHigh levels of youth unemployment have held our economy back, leaving lasting negative 
effects on the employment prospects of young people. Addressing this requires co-ordinated 
action across a range of organisations, led by the Skills and Employment Partnership, to 
broaden young people's opportunities and ensure that they can compete more effectively in a 
difficult labour market.¶*0&$, 2015)  
 
Active labour market policies aim to respond to weak competition by improving the skills 
and capacities of the local labour force.  This response takes the form of training provision, 
such as apprenticeships.  At the local level there are numerous small scale policy 
interventions which primarily target unemployed youth and NEET (not in employment, 
education or training) status young people. Talent Match and the Greater Manchester Youth 
Contract Extension (GMYCE), both launched in 2004, are examples of local state 
interventions. Talent Match provides jobs coaches to support young people who are furthest 
from labour markets.  GMYCE aims to assist young long-term unemployed enter into 
employment by providing cash incentives to businesses which hire young people.   By its 
own admission, AGMA has struggled to achieve the targets it set for reducing youth 
unemployment: µ$OO*0
V\RXWKHPSOR\PHQWSURJUDPPHVDUHSHUIRUPLQJIDUEHWWHUWKDQWKH\
were but not quite to target. However, in a climate of slightly increasing youth 
unemployment, this represents significant progress and lessons learned from these need to be 
built inWRIXWXUHDFWLYLW\¶(AGMA, 2016).  Despite the positive rhetoric, the failure to meet 
targets in the face of broader changes in employment levels indicate how the local state is 
constrained from substantive intervention in labour markets informed by social democratic 
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aspirations.  The nature of the targets themselves are also indicative of the contemporary 
focus of the local state; the aim is to reduce youth unemployment and NEET status, rather 
than seek to facilitate the movement into high-paid, higher productivity work.  
 
 
4. Discussion: The limits of growth & reform strategies   
The SDSHU¶V findings and related arguments are discussed in terms of the two research 
questions which the main body of the paper addresses. Firstly, the extent to which changes in 
the local governance of the state are informed by broader changes implemented to support 
%ULWDLQ¶VILQDQFH-led capitalism. The strategy of the local state in Greater Manchester is to a 
large extent constrained by the national state, and the increased power of capital, which 
national policy directly enables.   The local state can no longer pursue autonomous policies 
for job creation inspired by social democratic aspirations. Instead of this the local state 
apparatus aims to enable and create favourable conditions for capital and private sector job 
creation, often flowing from inward investment.  However, the numbers of jobs created from 
inward FDI are limited, and most job creation is indigenous to Greater Manchester.  It is the 
case that most growth is in low-waged sectors where labour is forced into a reliance on debt-
fuelled consumption as a result of the shift towards financialised accumulation at a systemic 
level (Folkman et al., 2016).  It is in the restrictions on local state autonomy that the shifts in 
capital accumulation become evident.  
 
In spite of the various economic strategies deployed by the local state economic outcomes in 
the county are mixed, and are largely detrimental to young workers. Although the GVA of 
*UHDWHU0DQFKHVWHU¶VHFRQRP\JUHZDWQHDUO\GRXEOHWKHQDWLRQDODYHUDJHLQ$*0$
2014) the increase in both low-paid work and economic inequality across the county bring 
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into question just how equitable this growth is for residents, as the outcomes of economic 
growth are distributed unevenly across the working population. The restructuring of capital in 
Greater Manchester into smaller, potentially less innovative units in elementary sectors 
results from the fusion of finance-led capitalism alongside the promotion of labour market 
competition on the basis of low wages and lesser regulation by the central state. In part these 
policies rest on a competitive advantage in finance and employment growth which focusses 
on inward investment, the growth of the elementary service economy in particular and a 
deliberate cheapening of youth labour. The low value-added low-wage business models of 
local firms allow any productivity gains from such employment to be appropriated by 
investors and owners at the expense of retained profit for further investment in innovation ± 
the latter being key aspect of full-employment capitalism (Clark, 2016).  
 
The second research question centres on how young people in Manchester experience 
changes in the state policy on work and employment. The sectors of *UHDWHU0DQFKHVWHU¶V 
local economy that are promoted as high-growth and  high-value added have suffered a 
decline in job longevity and retention, most notably financial services and manufacturing 
(New Economy; 2016a).  Similarly, whilst Greater Manchester has experienced high levels of 
business start-ups, it has some of the lowest business survival rates of any UK city-region, 
indicating that although Greater Manchester may be good at attracting business, it is less 
successful at sustaining it (AGMA, 2015; Enterprise Research Council, 2016). This reflects 
the neoliberalism of free market economics where the creation of market mechanisms is 
assumed in turn to create jobs. The creation and stimulation of markets and market 
approaches to accumulation in the private and the public sector of the national and local state 
is viewed by state managers as more democratic than the processes of job creation in the 
embedded liberalism of full-employment capitalism.  Accordingly the approach taken to 
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labour market reform by the local state is similarly limited in scope.  The prominence given 
to skills-based solutions is marginal and because of this low productivity within labour 
markets is attributed to the individual worker, rather than with structural weaknesses in the 
composition of the local labour market, or the British political economy.  Rather than trying 
to resolve structural labour market issues ± such as the presence of large numbers of 
businesses with low-valued added business models - the local state has instead continued to 
promote a discourse which individualises the skills issue. This approach aims to overcome 
perceived skills shortages through the promotion of market-facing training, and associated 
notions of employability and entrepreneurialism.  A particular problem with this market-led 
approach to training provision is that markets are inherently limited in their ability to resolve 
skills shortages; this is DUHFXUUHQW IHDWXUHRI%ULWDLQ¶V ODUJHO\YROXQWDULVWDSSURDFK WRVNLOOV
and training (Keep, 2000; Lloyd & Payne, 2016).  Although some employers in Greater 
Manchester identify skills shortages as a barrier to growth many are unwilling to invest in 
skills development, and resort to using temporary staffing agencies, or poaching skilled 
workers, rather than investing in training (Ward, 2005).  Policy documents demonstrate this, 
stating that a major challenge preventing an upskilling agenda is the distinct lack of employer 
engagement (GMCA, 2015).   
 
The marginal impact of direct local state labour market interventions in job creation raises the 
prospect that systemic structural issues may be the root of the problem, most crucially shifts 
in the form that accumulation has taken in Greater Manchester towards labour intensive 
service sectors, and the shifts in the orientation of state managers towards capital.  The local 
state is unable to influence the direction of this change, and its policies instead only mitigate 
the contradictory outcomes of capital accumulation.  Labour market policies implemented at 
the local level enable and reinforce shifts in power towards capital; GMYCE, for example, is 
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the local form of the national-level Youth Contract programme which is a subsidy to 
business, as employers are rewarded for merely engaging young people, often on a temporary 
basis.  Little consideration is given to the form of this employment, associated minimum 
wages levels or opportunities for progression. Rather, the converse is true; young people are 
lawfully discriminated against in the form of age-stratified minimum wage enforced by the 
national state which is compounded by the recent introduction of the national living wage, 
which only applies to over 25s.  The effect of the minimum wage and national wage devalue 
youth labour-power in the form of wage-caps but aim to increase the productivity of young 
workers through work intensification. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the aims of local economic strategies in Greater Manchester for young people 
are confined to attempting to place young people into employment. This highlights the 
inability of the local state to moderate the contradictions of capital accumulation across the 
county.  In Greater Manchester, efforts to engage in ostensibly social democratic strategies 
through the promotion of headline and elementary sectors have instead increased the power 
of private employers.  The increased power of private capital has further entrenched 
disciplinary value relations across the county and has done little to mitigate or challenge 
enduring structural issues. The expansion of low-paid, de-skilled, intensified insecure7 work, 
associated social polarisation between the North and South of the county and traffic and 
environmental problems continue apace. These challenges together, with a looming housing 
crisis, risk a bigger crisis of social reproduction for young workers as neoliberal governance 
strategies are further embedded in the local state.  
                                                 
7
 Post-recession, full-time employment has increased by 1.7% in Greater Manchester.  Self- employment has 
grown by 32%.  Flexible employment by has grown by 23% and part-time employment by 12%.  These figures 
are for all-age workers.  (New Economy, 2016a: 18) 
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These challenges reveal imperatives which local state strategies impose on employment 
conditions in Greater Manchester.  The paper demonstrates that the local state is severely 
restricted in its ability to actively intervene in local labour markets. This is so because of the 
institutional composition of the British state and because of shifts in British political 
economy which see private capital secure greater influence over local economies, a tendency 
WKDWLVUHIOHFWHGLQWKHHPHUJHQFHRIµHQWUHSUHQHXULDOXUEDQLVP¶in the  local state.  As a result 
of these processes, attempts by the local state to engage in progressive reform necessarily 
occur within a narrow range of policy options which reflect the needs of capital in Greater 
Manchester; namely the need for largely de-skilled young workers who can enter the growing 
service economy across the county.   
 
The position of young workers in this accumulation strategy is unquestioned by local 
politicians and state managers.  Young workers are a source of cheap labour-power for the 
service sector, and their low incomes are used a source of profit for both the private rental 
sector and to grow the consumptive economy of Greater Manchester.  Few direct attempts are 
made by the local state to try and intervene and coordinate the labour market for young 
workers, other than to move long-term unemployed into work or to upskill those with the 
lowest qualifications.  All of this leads to large numbers of young workers continuing to 
experience some of the worst aspects of contemporary labour markets, marked by some of 
the poorest labour conditions and lowest levels of remuneration. 
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Figure 1. Structure of Manchester Growth Company 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MGC website; AGMA. 
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Table 1. Employment of  16-24 year old and all-age workers in Greater Manchester, by sector 
  Employee Jobs By Sector Employees aged 16-
24 in Greater 
Manchester (%) 
All-age employment in 
Greater Manchester  
 
Greater 
Manchest
er (%) 
 
North West 
Region of 
Great Britain  
(%) 
Great 
Britain  
(%) 
Total Employee Jobs  167,233 (100) 1,196,900 100 100 100 
Primary Services:  Agriculture and 
Mining (A-B)  
 
2,005 (1.1) 
500 0.0 0.1 0.4 
Energy And Water (D-E) 12,800 1.1 1.0 1.1 
Manufacturing (C) 8,808 (5.3) 104,700 8.8 10.3 8.5 
Construction (F) 11,031 (6.6) 50,400 4.2 4.5 4.5 
Wholesale And Retail, Including 
Motor Trades (G) 
67,979* (40.6) 190,800 15.9 16.2 15.9 
Transport Storage (H) 8,772** (5.3) 57,400 4.8 4.5 4.5 
Accommodation And Food Services 
(I) 
- 75,300 6.3 7.1 7.1 
Information And Communication (J) - 37,800 3.2 2.7 4.1 
Financial And Other Business 
Services (K-N) 
26,492 (15.9) 288,800 24.1 20.5 22.2 
Public Admin, Education And Health 
(O-Q) 
29,921 (17.9) 326,100 27.2 28.5 27.4 
Other Services (R-S) 12,225 (7.3) 52,400 4.4 4.5 4.4 
Source: UK Census 2011; ONS business register and employment survey (BRES) 
Notes: 
*This figure includes accommodation and food services workers.  
**This figure includes information and communication workers.   
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Table 2. Occupations of 16-24 year olds in Greater Manchester, 2011 
Occupation Age 16 and 
over in each 
occupation 
Age 16 to 24 
occupation 
Percentage of 16 
and over in each 
occupation (%) 
Percentage of 16 
- 24 who work 
in each 
occupation (%) 
Percentage of 
each 
occupation 
made up by 16 
-24 year olds 
Change since 2001 
of percentage of 
each occupation 
made up by 16-24 
year olds 
All categories 1,223,865 167,233 100% 100% 14% -1 
1. Managers, 
directors and senior 
officials 
115,717 5,611 9% 3% 
5% 
 
-1 
2. Professional 
occupations 
 
202,432 
 
11,640 
 
17% 
 
7% 6% 
-1 
3. Associate 
professional and 
technical occupations 
 
 
146,373 
 
 
16,246 
 
 
12% 
 
 
10% 11% 
-1 
4. Administrative and 
secretarial 
occupations 
 
146,473 
 
18,749 
 
12% 
 
11% 
13% 
-2 
5. Skilled trades 
occupations 
 
129,634 
 
16,432 
 
11% 
 
10% 13% 
-1 
6. Caring, leisure and 
other service 
occupations 
 
 
119,786 
 
 
19,645 
 
 
10% 
 
 
11% 16% 
-1 
7. Sales and customer 
service occupations 
 
122,012 
 
40,415 
 
10% 
 
24% 33% 
0 
8. Process, plant and 
machine operatives 
 
97,547 
 
6,160 
 
8% 
 
4% 6% 
-3 
9. Elementary 
occupations 
 
143,891 
 
32,335 
 
12% 
 
19% 22% 
+2 
Source: UK Census 2001; UK Census 2011 
 
 
 
 
    
 
